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In Brown Construction Co. v. Washoe Housing Authority, No.
86-2537 (10th Cir., Jan. 4, 1988), the court of appeals reversed
the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss this diversity
suit pending consideration in the appropriate tribal forum. The
court applied the Supreme Court's holding in Iowa Mutual In-
surance Co. v. LaPlante,' noting that Iowa Mutual was decided
after the district court's ruling. The court held that considera-
tions of comity require the plaintiff to exhaust its tribal remedies
before a federal court will consider the case.
In rejecting Brown's argument that the "sue and be sued" clause
in the contract between Brown and Washoe supported federal
diversity jurisdiction, the court, citing Weeks Construction, Inc.
v. Oglala Sioux Housing Authority,2 agreed with the district court
that federal jurisdiction cannot be established by consent. The
court rejected Brown's argument that congressional intent was to
apply the diversity statute in cases involving the U.S. Housing
Act of 1937.1
1. 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987).
2. 797 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1986).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1982).
In Navajo Nation v. District Court for Utah County, No. 85-2649
(10th Cir., Oct. 21, 1987), the court of appeals dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction an action seeking a declaratory judgment as to
whether state or tribal courts have jurisdiction over proceedings
to determine the custody of a Navajo child.
The court cited Allen v. Wright in noting that when issues are
mooted, their jurisdiction is lost.' The court found the issues
mooted by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in In re Adoption
of Holloway.2 In In re Holloway, the court held that the state
of Utah cannot assert its rule for determining the domicile of a
child to defeat the underlying purposes of the Indian Child Welfare
Act.3
1. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
2. 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986).
3. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982).
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TRUST FUNDS: Timber: Accounting
In Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Barlow, No. 85-5272
(8th Cir., Dec. 9, 1987), the court of appeals reversed the district
court's dismissal and order of return of transferred funds to the
sawmill account of the tribe. The court had retained jurisdiction
in the case and found contrary to the Secretary of the Interior's
claim that the appeal was moot.
The Secretary contended that under the Act of May 18, 1916,'
creating a forest reserve within the boundaries of the reservation,
he was under no obligation to do anything with the funds other
than hold them to the credit of the tribe, collecting interest and
available for future use at the sawmill. The tribe argued that the
sawmill had been closed since 1984 and was unprofitable and that
the funds should be transferred to its general account. The court
held that the Secretary read the 1916 Act too narrowly and the
tribe too broadly.
The court cited Preston v. Heckler' in recognizing its duty to
construe such statutes liberally "with all doubts resolved in favor
of the Indians." The court remanded with instructions that the
district court determine whether a sawmill can be operated that
will benefit the tribe. If it can, the court directed that the funds
be used for that purpose. If a sawmill is not economically viable,
the court directed that the funds be retained in the "sawmill ac-
count" for any forestry or land management projects that could
benefit the tribe. If no such projects could benefit the tribe, the
court directed the funds to be transferred to the tribe's general
account to be used for its general welfare.'
1. Ch. 125, 39 Stat. 123, 127 (1916); Ch. 927, 70 Stat. 982 (1956); 72 Stat. 958 (1958).
2. 734 F.2d 1359, 1369 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing, e.g., Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S.
1, 6-7 (1956)).
3. 25 U.S.C. § 155 (1982).
WATER RIGHTS
In Joint Board of Control of the Flathead, Mission & Jocko Ir-
rigation Districts v. United States, No. 86-4317 (9th Cir., Nov.
17, .1987), the court of appeals reversed the district court's grant
of injunctive relief. The district court had enjoined the Bureau
of Indian Affairs from continuing to implement the 1986 Interim
Instream Flow and Pool Level Agreement. The district court found
that the BIA in 1986 was protecting the tribes at the expense of




that the BIA must be guided by "just and equitable distribution"
of "all waters of the Reservation."
In reversing, the court noted that Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes v. Namen had determined that one of the tribes
exercised aboriginal fishing rights.I The court noted their previous
holding in United States v. Adair that similar treaty language clearly
preserved those rights and the water needed for them.2 The court
held that it was error for the district court to hold that water
claimed under potentially prior tribal fishing rights must be shared
with junior appropriators.
1. 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982).
2. 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
In Metropolitan Water District of Southern California v. United
States, Nos. 86-6332, 86-6741 (9th Cir., Oct. 14, 1987), the court
of appeals remanded to the district court, with directions to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals heard the case on
the intervenors' (the Quechan, Fort Mojave, and Colorado River
Indian tribes) motion for interlocutory review.
Citing Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California Board of
Equalization,' the court held that an application to the Supreme
Court under a continuing decree for a reallocation of water rights
cannot be viewed as a waiver of sovereign immunity by the United
States. The court also held that the government is immune from
suit under the Quiet Title Act2 when it claims an interest in real
property based upon that property's status as trust or restricted
Indian lands, and that the United States cannot allow a suit that
would permit third parties to interfere with its discharge of its
responsibilities to Indian tribes with respect to trust lands. The
court noted its holding in Wildman v. United States that nothing
in the Quiet Title Act suggests that the federal government is to
be put to the burden of establishing its title when it has a col-
orable claim and asserts its immunity on behalf of Indian trust
land.'
The court further held that the McCarran Amendment does
not authorize private suits to decide priorities between the United
States and particular claimants."
1. 757 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1985).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1982).
3. Slip op. at 9-10 (9th Cir., Sept. 14, 1987).
4. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982).
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1988
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol14/iss1/5
